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ABSTRACT 
The abuses at Abu Ghraib, an American-run prison in Iraq, raise the question, how does 
torture happen in a society whose members for the most part believe that doing harm to 
others is wrong? Ronald Crelinsten (2003) offers the explanation that people create an 
alternate reality in which torture is justified. Three types of people, perpetrators, victims, 
and bystanders, participate in the maintenance of this alternate reality. My study is an 
instantiation of Crelinsten's framework. It focuses on the perpetrators at Abu Ghraib. I 
propose that two types of perpetrators participated in the abuses: the soldiers and 
personnel in the U.S. government bureaucracy. Although we cannot truly know whether 
or not an alternate reality existed, we can examine public definitions of the nature of the 
enemy made by government officials that suggest current international protocols of war 
do not apply to the enemy. By recognizing the definitions offered that could result in the 
creation of an alternate reality which includes torture, we can learn how to prevent its 
construction. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the "War on Terror" and the preemptive war against Iraq in 2003 and 
2004, American soldiers abused detainees held in Abu Ghraib prison located near 
Baghdad. After several independent investigations by the U.S. government, investigators 
found a pattern of abuse against detainees prior to Abu Ghraib. Abuses also occurred at 
Guantanamo Bay and Afghanistan, both sites used to hold detainees from the so-called 
"War on Terror." The abuses at Abu Ghraib caught the public's attention after 
photographs taken of soldiers posing with the abused detainees were broadcast on the 
national television news program, 60 Minutes II. Two days later, journalist Seymour 
Hersh (2004a) printed a story in The New Yorker outlining the specific abuses against 
these detainees and also displaying the same pictures shown on 60 Minutes II. 
The abuses at Abu Ghraib raise sociological questions of why such harmful 
behavior might be perpetrated and allowed to continue. Ronald Crelinsten (2003) 
addresses these questions on a general level. He explains that people involved in torture, 
the perpetrators, the victims, and the bystanders, all participate in the shared construction 
of realities. Although torturous behavior may not be directly condoned, it is allowed to 
continue by inaction. Crelinsten's (2003) framework explains both action and inaction 
with the notion of alternate realities. 
Organization of Thesis 
In Section II of this thesis, following this introduction, I describe my methodology 
and data. The data are extensive due to the current nature of the A]?u Ghraib abuses as 
well as public interest in it. Even a year after the story first broke, "Abu Ghraib" is still 
appearing in the media on a regular basis. The amount of information is not only large, 
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but the data are also being continually updated because at the time of this writing, 
investigations are still ongoing. 
Section III lays out what happened at Abu Ghraib. I provide a history of both 
Abu Ghraib and related events in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay. In the same 
section, I describe the abuses inflicted on the detainees by the U.S. military. I review 
military protocol and procedural guidelines for interrogations. Finally, I consider the 
speculations of James Schlesinger and Major General George Fay (2004) on why the 
abuses at Abu Ghraib occurred. 
Section IV provides the theoretical framework that I applied to the events at Abu 
Ghraib. This section summarizes Ronald Crelinsten's (2003) model of why torture 
occurs in a "humane" society. Crelinsten (2003) explains that people create alternate 
realities that neutralize the use of torture, either by condoning the behavior or by inaction 
and ambivalence. In addition to Crelinsten's framework, I briefly detail other 
sociological theories that parallel Crelinsten' s (2003) work. 
Section V offers my analysis. I apply Crelinsten's framework to the events at 
Abu Ghraib and examine the conditions conducive to the creation of an alternate reality. 
Finally, Section VI follows with a discussion and a proposal for future research in the 
area of torture and the creation of alternate realities. 
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II. METHODOLOGY 
Data 
Because the abuses at Abu Ghraib have been covered in the media since April 
2004, a vast amount of literatur� on the topic exists, ranging from news reports to 
government documents to editorial opinions. Yet, the empirical ground of the events at 
Abu Ghraib is still shifting. More reports are generated every day due to the ongoing 
investigation of the events at Abu Ghraib. Since new reports continue to appear, I have 
chosen to limit my data to only those reports issued from September 11, 2001 through 
April 14, 2005. The beginning date is significant because it marks the events of the 
terrorist attacks of 9-11 (to be discussed in further detail in the section entitled 
"Afghanistan"). These events are crucial for understanding the context leading up to the 
military presence at Abu Ghraib. 
My investigation relies heavily on secondary analysis of government documents, 
including the Pentagon's investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and select 
unofficial sources. I chose secondary analysis because the U.S. government already 
collected and compiled the data within the Pentagon's investigations. I use the 
government reports on those investigations to instantiate Crelinsten's (2003) theory. 
The government documents are comprehensive sources recounting the abuses at 
Abu Ghraib and the protocols in place on �e treatment of prisoners, as reported in 
interviews. Two important government sources are the report of the Independent Panel 
chaired by Former Defense Secretary and Advisory Counsel Member James Schlesinger, 
and the report of the Pentagon chaired by Major General George Fay (Strasser, 2004). I 
reference the Pentagon's investigation to lay out the groundwork of what occurred 
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leading up to and during the abuses at Abu Ghraib. The Torture Papers by Karen J. 
Greenberg and Joshua L. Dratel (2005) and Seymour Hersh's The Chain of Command 
(2004) are two unofficial sources that corroborate, in thoroughness and focus, on the Abu 
Ghraib (as opposed to other) abuses, the official documents. Greenberg and Dratel's 
(2005) book is a compilation of the declassified memos written by the Bush 
Administration leading up to and during the abuses at Abu Ghraib. I used Greenberg and 
Dratel' s compilation of memos to place the events leading up to and at Abu Ghraib in 
historical context. To present the data in as efficient and organized fashion as possible, I 
present the memos in chronological order. When I quote military personnel, or those 
associated closely with them, and members of the bureaucratic administration, I use both 
the Pentagon's reports and media sources, such as newspaper or television interviews. I 
also reference MSNBC's reports on some of the statements released by the detainees at 
Abu Ghraib as well as pictures of the abused detainees at Abu Ghraib taken by the 
soldiers who participated in the abuses. I use both government and non-government 
reports to corroborate the abuses and their institutional contexts. 
Limitations of Official Documents 
Significant limitations exist when using official documents for a historical 
analysis. The researcher conducting a project on a current event involving the 
government faces methodological and epistemological problems. First, a researcher can 
only use what is declassified. All of the documents surrounding Abu Ghraib were not 
declassified by the end of my research period, April 1 4, 2005, and therefore could not be 
used for my thesis. 
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A second limitation in using official documents, specifically memoranda, is that 
there is no way to know what occurs between the times that a memo is drafted and when 
it is actually sent. Understanding what happens between the times that a memo is written 
and the time that the same memo is sent may indicate the urgency and accuracy of a 
memo (Wood, 2004). For example, ifl drafted a memo on the progress ofmy thesis, but 
did not send it for a substantial period of time, a person might assume either (1) the 
progress of my thesis has likely changed since I first drafted the memo and/or (2) the 
memo was not extremely urgent in the first place. Acknowledging this limitation, I have 
chosen to present the documents according to the date given on the memo. There is also 
no way to know in what manner the memo was viewed. Was it posted on a bulletin 
board that most people ignored? Did government advisors read it around the water cooler 
and joke about it? Was it presented in a formal meeting? A researcher typically cannot 
account for the context in which an official document was presented, thus creating a gap 
in the interpretation of the context of that document (Wood, 2004). 
A third limitation, one that is related to my point about classified documents, is 
more critical. Governments lie-both by telling untruths and by failing to disclose truths. 
For example, consider the investigation into two detainee deaths in Afghanistan during 
2002 (Golden, 2005). Army investigators had autopsy reports stating that the cause of 
death for both detainees was "blunt force trauma." In addition, several soldier accounts 
stated that these two detainees died after being hit by American military guards. 
Nonetheless, the Army investigators still wanted to close the case without filing any 
criminal charges. Although eventually further investigations charged seven soldiers, the 
investigation took two years to complete (Golden, 2005). 
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Another example of this limitation concerns St. Louis Cardinals' football player 
Pat Tillman. Tillman served as an Army Ranger and was killed in Afghanistan on April 
22, 2004. Initial press releases and statements given by Army officials stated that 
Tillman was killed by members of the Taliban while charging up a hill. A few weeks 
after his nationally televised funeral, Commanding General of U.S. Army Special 
Operations, Philip Kensinger, announced that an investigation determined that Tillman 
was actually killed by friendly fire. The results of this investigation were made available 
to officials shortly after Tillman's death and before his memorial service on May 3, 2004. 
The army waited to publicly announce that Tillman had been killed by friendly fire until 
May 29, 2004 (Jackson, 2005). In both of these examples, it is clear that the government 
lies by telling untruths and by not disclosing information. Recognizing this limitation, 
my solution is the corroboration of sources. 
Definition of Terms 
To establish clarity when using particular terminology in my thesis, the definition 
of specific terms is necessary. I use the term abuses to refer to any behavior-physical, 
emotional or verbal-in violation of the Geneva Conventions and military protocol. 
When I refer to bureaucracy, I am referring to the military leaders associated with the 
abuses at Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib, as well as the executive 
branch from 2001 through 2005. Finally, the term accountability in my thesis signifies 
the oversight of most or all individual action by others and particularly by supervisors. 
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III. HISTORY: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 
A New Kind of War 
The attacks by Al Qaeda terrorists on September 11, 2001 prompted U.S. 
President George W. Bush to declare ''war" on Afghanistan, where most members of the 
Al Qaeda network presumably lived. The military action against Al Qaeda in 
Afghanistan was more an armed attack supported by the idea that the terrorists were 
hiding out there. He declared this action as a "War on Terror," thus claiming to be 
fighting a faceless enemy. Given that the enemy of the "War on Terror" was purportedly 
unlike any enemy that the current administration, or any prior administration, had faced, 
the Department of Defense allegedly had to reevaluate the policies established to deal 
with enemies during wartime. 
Interrogation techniques are often used during wartime to gain more intelligence 
on the enemy (Field Manual 34-52, 1992). The techniques of interrogation outlined as 
part of the "War' on Terror" were used in both Guantanamo Bay, Cuba 1 and Afghanistan. 
Afghanistan was the main theater for the "War on Terror," and Guantanamo Bay served 
as the holding site for prisoners from the "War on Terror." Similar techniques were used 
at the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad, Iraq. Some of these techniques were of an 
elaborate and degrading physical and even sexual nature. Their publication through 
videotaping and photographing met with mass disapproval on a global scale. The 
historical background that follows provides the foundation for an analysis of how such 
1 Prisoners captured as part of the War on Terror in Afghanistan were detained at a military base in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 
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torture is made possible when committed against a group labeled as an enemy 
(Crelinsten, 2003). 
Afghanistan 
On Tuesday, September 1 1 ,  2001 , two hijacked commercial airplanes flew into 
the Twin Towers at the World Trade Center in New York. One plane hit the north tower 
at 8:45 a;m. and the second plane hit the south tower at 9:02 a.m. Shortly after, at 9:40 
a.m., another hijacked plane hit the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. At 9:58 a.m. the north 
tower of the World Trade Center collapsed followed by the south tower at 10:28 a.m. 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004). Another plane was supposed to 
attack the White House but the passengers over-powered the hijackers and the attempt 
was thwarted. In this instance, all of the passengers were killed when the plane crashed 
in a field in Pennsylvania. The death toll of all the attacks of September 1 1th , 2001 is 
estimated to have exceeded three thousand. 
Although no one took responsibility immediately after the attacks, the American 
government soon identified an attacker. President Bush addressed the nation on 
September 20, 2001, stating, "The evidence we have gathered all points to a collection of 
loosely affiliated terrorist organizations known as al Qaeda" (Bush, 2001 ). He explained, 
"The leadership of al Qaeda has great influence in Afghanistan and supports the Taliban 
regime in controlling most of that country. In Afghanistan, we see al Qaeda's vision for 
the world" (Bush, 2001 ). 
In the weeks following the September 1 1  attacks, President George W. Bush and 
his advisors drafted reports to send to Congress on retaliation against the perpetrators of 
the attacks and their supporters. On September 18, 2001 , Congress nearly unanimously 
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accepted the Authorization for Use of Military Force against Al Qaeda and the Taliban, 
an Afghani political party supportive of Al-Qaeda. U.S. intelligence indicated that 
Afghanistan housed both terrorist groups and that Al Qaeda and the Taliban were both 
considered prominent within the Afghani government (Schlesinger, 2004). On October 
7, 2001, the "War on Terror" began (Cirillo and Ricchiardi, 2004). The United States 
initiated hostilities and captured the first detainees shortly thereafter in November 2001 
(Schlesinger, 2004). 
The U.S. government was allegedly engaging in a war unlike any other in its 
history. Hence, in a September 20, 2001 address to our nation, President Bush stated, 
"Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans 
should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any other we have ever 
seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert operations, secret even 
in success" (2001 ). The novelty of this war extended to treatment of prisoners. On the 
advice of some of his advisors, on February 7, 2002, President Bush released a memo 
declaring that the Geneva Conventions were not applicable to the conflict with Al-Qaeda 
(Schlesinger, 2004). The memo explained that the Geneva Conventions did apply to 
Afghanistan civilians but that members of the Taliban were actually "unlawful 
combatants" and therefore should not receive the treatment outlined for prisoners of war 
according to the Geneva Conventions (Schlesinger, 2004). Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, however, all 
disagreed with the President's memo and stated that the treatment of detainees should 
follow those outlined by the Geneva Conventions regardless of their membership in Al 
Qaeda or terrorism (Schlesinger, 2004). 
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Guantanamo Bay 
On Oc�ober 1 1 ,  2002, military officials at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba requested 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld' s authorization of stronger interrogation techniques. On 
December 2, 2002, Rumsfeld responded with the authorization of 16  additional stronger 
interrogation techniques (Schlesinger, 2004). Rumsfeld and his advisors classified these 
techniques into two types: Category II and Category 1112 • Schlesinger (2004) reported: 
Reacting to tenacious resistance by some detainees to existing 
interrogation methods, which were essentially limited to those in Army 
Field Manual 34-52, Guantanamo authorities in October 2002 requested 
approval of strengthened counter-interrogation techniques to increase 
intelligence yield from interrogations. This request was accompanied by a 
recommended tiered list of techniques, with the proviso that harsher 
Category III methods could be used only on "exceptionally resistant 
detainees" and with the approval by higher headquarters (Schlesinger, 
2004:31 ). 
Category II interrogation techniques were outlined by Jerald Phifer, advisor to Rumsfeld, 
as follows: 
(1 ) The use of stress positions (like standing) for a maximum of four 
hours. 
(2) The use of falsified documents or reports. 
(3) Use of the isolation facility for up to 30 days. Request must be made 
through the OIC [Officer In Charge], Interrogation Section, to the 
Director, Joint Interrogation Group (JIG). Extensions beyond the initial 
30 days must be approved by Commanding General. For selected 
detainees, the OIC, Interrogation Section, will approve all contacts with 
the detainee, to include medical visits of a non-emergent nature. 
( 4) Interrogating the detainee in an environment other than the standard 
interrogation booth. 
( 5) Deprivation of light and auditory stimuli. 
( 6) The detainee may also have a hood placed over his head during 
transportation and questioning. The hood shall not restrict breathing in 
2 Category I techniques w�re conceived as the mildest form of interrogation techniques. They include 
yelling and some minor forms of deception. Category I techniques could be used at will with detainees. 
Category II and Category III techniques are stronger interrogation techniques and required the approval of 
commanding officers (Schlesinger, 2004). 
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any way and the detainee should be under direct observation when 
hooded. 
(7) The use of 20-hour interrogations. 
(8) Removal of all comfort items (including religious items). 
(9) Switching the detainees from hot rations to MREs. 
(1 0) Removal of clothing. 
(1 1 )  Forced grooming (shaving of facial hair, etc.). 
(1 2) Using detainees' individual phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce 
stress (Phifer, October 1 1 ,  2002 :2).· 
Phifer stated that the recommendation of additional techniques not identified as Category 
II and Category III techniques could be submitted to Rumsfeld along with the safeguards 
the interrogator intended to use to ensure the detainee's right guaranteed by the Geneva 
Conventions and the rationale for using such techniques. Phifer also commented, 
"Nothing in this memorandum in any way restricts your existing authority to maintain 
good order and discipline among detainees" (2002: 1 ). 
On January 15, 2003, Rumsfeld rescinded authorization of the use of all Category 
II techniques and one Category III technique on the advice of the Navy General Counsel. 
The one Category III technique rescinded was "The use of mild, non-injurious physical 
contact such as grabbing, poking in the chest with the finger, and light pushing" (Haynes, 
November 27, 2002 :1). Additional Category III techniques not rescinded included 
threatening the detainees with death for themselves and/or their families as well as the 
use of a wet towel and dripping water to induce the perception of suffocation for the 
detainee (Phifer, October 1 1 ,  2002:2). In his January 15, 2003 memo Rumsfeld also 
stated that the remaining Category II and III interrogation techniques that were not 
rescinded must only be used with his express consent (Rumsfeld, 2003). In the same 
memo, Rumsfeld added, "In all interrogations, you should continue the humane treatment 
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of detainees, regardless of the type of interrogation technique employed" (Rumsfeld, 
January 15, 2003: 1 ). 
Later in January 2003, Rumsfeld convened a new committee referred to as the 
Working Group, to examine interrogation techniques. Air Force General Counsel Mary 
Walker was appointed as chair. The Working Group involved members from both 
military and intelligence organizations as well as lawyers from the Office of Legal 
Counsel (Schlesinger, 2004). The Working Group evaluated 35 interrogation techniques 
and ultimately presented 24 to Rumsfeld as legitimate (Schlesinger, 2004). The 
recommendation of the 24 interrogation techniques by the Working Group apparently led 
directly to Rumsfeld's memo dated April 16, 2003, in which he listed 25 interrogation 
techniques that were stronger than had been used before, to be used only at Guantanamo 
Bay. These supplemented the ones Rumsfeld had approved in January. These included 
sleep deprivation, isolation, the silent treatment, false flag (give the detainees the false 
impression that members of another country are interrogating them), environmental 
manipulation ( altering the detainees' environment to make them uncomfortable, like 
drastically changing the temperature or bringing a repulsive smell into the room), and 
"fear up harsh" ( considerably raising the fear level of a detainee) (Rumsfeld, April 1 6, 
2003). Rumsfeld stated, "I reiterate that U.S. Armed Forces shall continue to treat 
detainees humanely and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, 
in a manner consistent with the principles of the Geneva Conventions" (Rumsfeld, April 
1 6, 2003:1 ). The policies established by Rumsfeld in April 2003, based on the Working 
Group's recommendations, remained ground protocol at Guantanamo Bay (Schlesinger, 
2004). 
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Preemptive War on Iraq 
On March 1 9, 2003, the United States declared a preemptive war against Iraq. 
Iraq had been an undemocratic nation led by the dictator Saddam Hussein. Hussein had 
allegedly oppressed his own people as well as those of surrounding countries, such as 
Kuwait and Iran (U.S. Department of State, 2004). Hussein and his administration, 
primarily comprised of his family, were also alleged to be producing and harboring 
weapons of mass destruction. The supposed production and housing of weapons of mass 
destruction was a concern to the United States because Bush's Administration believed 
that Hussein's hatred for the United States could provoke him to ally with Al Qaeda and 
the Taliban and supply them with these weapons of mass destruction. Hussein denied the 
existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. When asked by the United States to 
disclose the whereabouts of these weapons, Hussein refused. The United Nations also 
sent weapons inspectors to Iraq to attempt to find the alleged nuclear weapons. After 
multiple "negotiations" with the United Nations, during which Saddam Hussein refused 
to disclose the location(s) of the weapons, the United States declared war on Iraq. 3 In his 
speech addressing the nation on the eve of war, President Bush said, "In this conflict, 
America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality" 
(Bush, 2003). Shortly following the declaration of a preemptive war, the military forces 
began to imprison Iraqi insurgents at Abu Ghraib. 
During the reign of Saddam Hussein, Abu Ghraib, located just outside of 
Baghdad, gained a reputation as one of the world's most horrific prisons. The reputation 
was earned by the despicable living conditions, weekly executions and torture that 
3 The United Nations opposed a war against I�aq (United Nations, 2003). 
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occurred at Abu Ghraib prison. Some sources claim that over fifty thousand prisoners, 
both men and women, were held at Abu Ghraib at any one time. Following the fall of 
Hussein's regime in April 2003, Abu Ghraib was completely looted. Anything that could 
be removed was. The Coalition forces, including American, British and Australian 
troops, remodeled the prison, adding a new medical facility, toilets, showers, and tiles for 
the floors. With these renovations, Abu Ghraib was turned into a U.S. military prison 
(Hersh, 2004)� 
As early as October 2003, the prisoners held at Abu Ghraib by Coalition forces 
numbered approximately seven thousand (Schlesinger, 2004). Coalition forces 
categorized them into three groups: "common criminals; security detainees suspected of 
'crimes against the Coalition' ;  and a small number of suspected 'high-value' leaders of 
the insurgency against the Coalition forces" (Hersh, 2004:21). 
Policies /or Interrogations 
In August 2003, the Joint Staff appointed Major General Geoffrey Miller to visit 
the detainee facilities in Iraq and meet with Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7), the 
military com�and post in Iraq, to discuss the intelligence gained from the detainees being 
interrogated. The aim of Miller's trip to Iraq was to evaluate interrogation policies in 
place with the intent of revising them (Schlesinger, 2004). Miller brought the list of 
interrogation techniques drafted by Rumsfeld on April 1 6, 2003. This list was to be used 
as a baseline for policies at Abu Ghraib. Miller showed it to Lieutenant General Ricardo 
Sanchez, the commander of CJTF-7. Recall that these techniques were to be used only at 
Guantanamo Bay (Schlesinger, 2004). When evaluating the facilities at Abu Ghraib, 
Miller reportedly suggested that stronger techniques should be used, and that policies 
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should be made as uniform as possible throughout Iraq. At this point, the standards for 
interrogation procedures were not widely known, even to the soldiers involved in the 
interrogation process. As a response to Miller's suggestions and a request from the 519th 
Military Intelligence Battalion (the battalion deployed from Afghanistan to Abu Ghraib) 
for written guidelines for appropriate interrogation procedures, Sanchez issued a memo 
including the authorization of 12  additional techniques. The additional techniques were 
not included in Manual 34-52 but were suggested by Sanchez and his advisors 
(Schlesinger, 2004). 
Even though Miller established that the techniques listed in Rumsfeld's April 1 6th 
memo were approved only for use at Guantanamo Bay, Sanchez reasoned in a report that · 
the detainees held at Abu Ghraib were also "unlawful combatants" and thus that these 
techniques were appropriate (Schlesinger, 2004). Sanchez assumed he held the power to 
authorize such aggressive procedures as well as to categorize the detainees as unlawful 
combatants (Schlesinger, 2004). Schlesinger (2004) reported, "The CJTF-7 Commander 
[Sanchez] , on the advice of his Staff Judge Advocate, believed he had the inherent 
authority of the Commander in a Theater of War to promulgate such a policy and make · 
determinations as to the categorization of detainees under the Geneva Conventions," (pp. 
8-9). Central Command, also referred to as CENTCOM, was the central command 
committee housed in Iraq. CENTCOM disagreed with Sanchez's view of his authority 
and referred to his procedures as overtly aggressive. In response, Sanchez withdrew the 
additional techniques of interrogation and authorized methods only mildly stronger than 
those listed in Manual 34-52 (Schlesinger, 2004 ). 
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Abuses 
At the time of the Official Reports of the Independent Panel and the Pentagon, 
155 investigations had been completed on the approximately 300 alleged incidents of 
abuse against prisoners at the Joint Operations Areas, which included Afghanistan, 
Guantanamo Bay, and Abu Ghraib. Sixty-six of the 155 investigations confirmed that 
U.S. forces had in fact abused detainees. Of the 66 confirmed investigations into the 
abuses, the Pentagon substantiated eight at Guantanamo Bay, three in Afghanistan and 5 5 
in Iraq at Abu Ghraib. Approximately one third of the alleged cases of abuses at the Joint 
Operations Areas occurred during interrogations (Schlesinger, 2004). There were five 
substantiated accounts of detainee death during interrogation, while 23 detainee deaths 
are under investigation at the time of this writing. 4 
In December 2003, the first commanding female officer in Iraq was appointed to 
office at Abu Ghraib, Army Reserve Brigadier General Janis Karpinski, who had no prior 
experience in supervising a prison. After the Pentagon received a report that addressed 
the abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib in January 2004, Karpinski was formally 
reprimanded and suspended from her post only a month after her initial deployment there. 
At approximately the same time, Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez ordered an 
investigation on the reports of abuse at Abu Ghraib by the 372nd Military Police 
Company and 320th Military Police Battalion. Lieutenant General Sanchez appointed 
Major General Antonio M. Taguba to head up the investigation (Hersh, 2004). In his 
4 Twenty of the 23 detainee deaths occurred in Iraq while the other three cases occurred in Afghanistan 
(Schlesinger, 2004). 
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report, Taguba recounted some of the abusive behavior occurring at Abu Ghraib by the 
Military Police (MP). His list is as follows: 
a. Punching, slapping, and kicking detainees; jumping on their naked feet; 
b. Videotaping and photographing naked male and female detainees; 
c. Forcibly arranging detainees in various sexually explicit positions for 
photographing; 
d. Forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked for 
several days at a time; 
e. Forcing naked male detainees to wear women's underwear; 
f. Forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate themselves while being 
photographed and videotaped; 
g. Arranging naked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them; 
h. Positioning a naked detainee on a MRE Box, with a sandbag on his 
head, and attaching wires to his fingers, toes, and penis to simulate electric 
torture; 
i. Writing "I am a Rapest" (sic) on the leg of a detainee alleged to have 
forcibly raped a 15-year old fellow detainee, and then photographing him 
naked; 
j. Placing a dog chain or strap around a naked detainee' s neck and having 
a female Soldier pose for a picture; 
k. A male MP guard having sex with a female detainee; 
1. Using military working dogs (without muzzles) to intimidate and 
frighten detainees, and in at least one case biting and severely injuring a 
detainee; 
m. Taking photographs of dead Iraqi detainees (Taguba, 2004 :16). 
Major General George R. Fay's investigation into the abuses at Abu Ghraib classified the 
abuses inflicted at Abu Ghraib into four groups: physical abuse which included the use of 
dogs; humiliating and degrading treatments which included nakedness, photographs, 
simulated sexual positions, and improper use of isolation; failure to safeguard detainees; 
and failure to report detainee abuse (Fay, 2004). 
The general physical abuse against detainees included slapping and kicking 
detainees, twisting the hands of a detainee while in handcuffs, and throwing balls at 
detainees. The Fay report also recounted an incident where a soldier held a hand over the 
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nose and mouth of a detainee to stop breatping. All of these incidents are in violation of 
interrogation procedural guidelines is�ued for Abu Ghraib by Rumsfeld and those 
outlined in Field Manual 34-52 (2004). 
Another type of physical abuse that the Fay report addressed was the use of dogs. 
The use of dogs is a common form of security for military prisons. The use of dogs, 
however, to threaten or intimidate detainees is a direct violation of military prison 
guidelines. The report mentioned an incident at Abu Ghraib where two Army dog 
handlers used dogs to intimidate two detainees to see which one urinated and defecated 
first. Another instance was when two Army dogs were let loose in a cell with two 
juvenile detainees. The detainees were terrified and attempted to hide behind each other 
(Fay, 2004). 
The physical abuse also turned sexual in several instances. For example, these 
abuses included forced participation in group masturbation and the rape of a detainee by 
an American translator (Fay 2004). 
A second type of abuse was humiliating and degrading treatment. The Fay report 
stated that any attempt to humiliate or degrade a detainee is a direct violation of Geneva 
Conventions IV, Field Manual 34-52, the additional techniques approved by Rumsfeld 
and Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Three types of humiliation and degrading 
treatment were identified by this report: nakedness, photographs and simulated sexual 
positions. Removal of detainees' clothing wa� apparently a common, or at least not 
uncolll!11on, practice at Abu Ghraib (Fay 2004). Most accounts indicated that the 
removal of detainees' clothing was a form of punishment for insubordination against 
interrogators or MPs. Additionally; female soldiers were present with naked male 
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detainees. Soldiers who reported this practice were informed that it was common 
procedure even though it was in direct violation of approved guidelines for holding 
detainees (Fay, 2004). Photographing .detainees in humiliating positions was another, 
ultimately notorious, form of degrading treatment. In several instances, detainees were 
posed in simulated sexual positions with other detainees and photographed. 
Another type of humiliating and degrading treatment used at Abu Ghraib was the 
unsanctioned use of isolation. Isolation is a common interrogation procedure, nominally 
designed to keep detainees from telling each other about interrogation techniques or 
sharing sensitive information with each other (Fay 2004). The Geneva Conventions IV 
stated that isolation should only be employed to maintain military security, but not as a 
form of punishment. Isolation was frequently used as a control technique or punishment 
at Abu Ghraib and therefore violated military protocol as established in Field Manual 34-
52 and the UCMJ as well as the Geneva Conventions (Fay 2004). 
A third type of abuse found at Abu Ghraib was the failure to safeguard detainees. 
Detainees at any military prison have the right according to the Geneva Conventions and 
Army Regulations to be "protected against all acts of violence and threats thereof and 
against insults and public curiosity" (Fay, 2004: 114). 
The fourth and final type of abuse at Abu Ghraib, according to Fay, was the 
failure to report detainee abuse. Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) states, "[when a soldier or other military official] violates or fails to obey any 
lawful general order or regulation; having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by 
any member of the armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or is 
derelict in the performance of his duties; shall be punished as a court-martial may direct" 
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(UCMJ, 2005). Not only could failure to report detainee abuse result in dereliction of 
duty for soldiers, but for contracted interrogators as well because all are bound by the 
Geneva Conventions (Fay, 2004). 
Fay's report also addressed other problems at Abu Ghraib that were not as easily 
categorized � specific abuses. The lack of cooperation and communication between the 
Military Police and Military Intelligence soldiers created problems in guarding the 
detainees. For example, the MPs were responsible for detainees' clothing; however, MI 
soldiers began as early as September 16, 2003, to institute nudity as an interrogation 
tactic. When the issue of the detainees' clothing was questioned, the answer commonly 
given was that there was a shortage of supply clothing. Fay (2004) reported, "Removal 
of clothing and nakedness were being used to humiliate detainees at the same time there 
was a general level of confusion as to what was allowable in terms of MP disciplinary 
measures and MI interrogations rules, and what clothing was available" (p. 1 15). 
Until April 28, 2004, when CBS's Sixty Minutes II aired a story about abuses 
against detainees, the military's actions at Abu Ghraib had been able to keep the abuses a 
"family matter" and out of the living rooms of the public. The pictures used on this 
episode of Sixty Minutes II depicted American soldiers with Iraqi prisoners posed in 
humiliating sexual positions. Intelligence journalist Seymour Hersh had also obtained the 
pictures as well as the Taguba report, which CBS did not have as of its broadcast. Hersh 
also learned that CBS had held off airing the story at the request of the Pentagon. The 
story finally aired on April 28, 2004. Two days later, Hersh's article profiling the abuses 
and displaying some of the pictures was printed in The New Yorker. Within months, the 
U.S. government organized multiple investigations into the abuse at Abu Ghraib, two of 
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which were the Official Reports of the Independent Panel and the Pentagon by 
Schlesinger and Fay (Hersh, 2004). 
Military Protocol and Procedural Guidelines for Interrogations 
A number of official protocols - national and international - guided the 
interrogation practices used at Abu Ghraib. In the summer of 2002, President Bush 
requested specific standards of interrogation techniques that would be in accordance with 
the United Nations (UN) Convention Against Torture (Schlesinger, 2004). The UN 
Convention Against Torture was created on July 16, 1994 and defined torture as: 
. any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him 
or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he 
or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or 
intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on 
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or 
at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official 
or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or 
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions 
( Convention Against Torture And Other Cruel, Inhuman Or Degrading 
Treatment Or Punishment, 1994: 1 ). 
The U.S. Office of Legal Counsel agreed with this definition of torture, but added that the 
allowable pain suffered must endure over time, as long as months and years (U.S. 
Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel, August 1, 2002). Also, the United States 
participated in and amended the UN definition of torture but was not a signatory of the 
UN Convention Against Torture. Afghanistan, however, was. 
Jay Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, sent a memo to Alberto Gonzales and 
William Haynes, Counsel to the President on January 22, 2002. This memo stated that 
members of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were not, by definition, prisoners of war but 
"unlawful combatants," therefore the Geneva Conventions would not apply to them 
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(Bybee, January 22, 2002). Discussion continued on the suspension of the Geneva 
Conventions for the "war" with Afghanistan. William Taft, a legal advisor to the 
Department of State, stated in a memo that the suspension of the Geneva Conventions 
would only provoke more danger for U.S . soldiers in the present war as well as future 
wars (Taft, February 2, 2002). Taft reported that the United States was showing the rest 
of the world how to avoid following the Geneva Conventions. 
As another source for standards of interrogation procedures, the Department of 
Defense used Army Field Manual 34-52. Manual 34-52 outlined 1 7  techniques approved 
for use while interrogating prisoners of war, which coincided with the treatment of 
prisoners of war as outlined by the Geneva Conventions. These techniques included 
more aggressive techniques than the 1 7  outlined by Manual 34-52 that seem to have been 
used in Afghanistan (Schlesinger, 2004). In a memo dated January 24, 2003, the 
Commander Joint Task Force- 1 80 presented a list of interrogation techniques employed 
in Afghanistan, several of which were not listed in Manual 34-52. The Commander Joint 
Task Force- 1 80 used the list as documentation that stronger techniques than those listed 
in Manual 34-52 were being used. 
Under Siege at Abu Ghraib: Reasons Why 
Schlesinger, Fay, and the other independent investigators speculated on why these 
abuses occurred. A commonly cited reason was lack of leadership and poorly articulated 
policies. Fay (2004), for example, found that "Ml personnel were also found not to have 
fully comported with established interrogation procedures and applicable laws and 
regulations. Theater Interrogation and Counter-Resistance Policies were found to be 
poorly defined, and changed several times. As a result, interrogation activities sometimes 
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crossed into abusive activity . . .  " (p. 110). Fay's report indicated that even when the 
abuses were brought to the attention of leaders stationed at Abu Ghraib, nothing was 
done to stop or prevent them. Fifty-four (54) MI, MP, medical soldiers and civilian 
contractors were found responsible to some extent: 27 of them were accused of some 
degree of responsibility while an additional seventeen were accused of misunderstanding 
procedure (Fay, 2004). 
Contributing to the lack of accountability at Abu Ghraib was the presence of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Fay reported that the CIA often gave the soldiers at 
Abu Ghraib the impression that the CIA had the authority to act outside protocols and 
procedures for interrogations. The CIA also housed "ghost detainees" at Abu Ghraib. 
Ghost detainees were prisoners who were kept secretly at Abu Ghraib. The purpose of 
secretly holding these detainees was so that the CIA staff members would not have to 
follow procedures when interrogating these detainees because if no one knew where they 
were, no one was held accountable for what was being done to them (Fay, 2004). 
Schlesinger (2004) stated in his report that appropriate training, leadership, and 
supervision could have prevented the abuses at Abu Ghraib. He located the problem in 
the individual perpetrators. Schlesinger (2004) reported, "Though acts of abuse occurred 
at a number of locations, those in Cell Block I have a unique nature fostered by the 
predilections of the noncommissioned [subordinate] officers in charge. Had these 
noncommissioned officers behaved more like those on the day shift, these acts, which 
one participant described as ' lust for the fun of it,' would not have taken place" (pp. 13-
14). Whereas Fay and Schlesinger are independent investigators, the causes they identify 
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for the Abu Ghraib torture do not indict an entire system or policy. Rather, they focus on 
individuals and supervision of individuals. 
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IV. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Foundational Theories 
Ronald Crelinsten's (2003) alternate reality theory provides the primary 
theoretical framework of my thesis. In this section I detail his work. But first I would 
like to touch on two theories that are relevant to my analysis as well. Gresham Sykes and 
David Matza ( 1957) offered ''techniques of neutralization" in an attempt to explain 
deviance of juveniles on an individual level. Sykes and Matza ( 1957) state, "We would 
argue that techniques of neutralization are critical in lessening the effectiveness of social 
controls . . .  " (p. 669). Sykes and Matza's five techniques of neutralization are: denial of 
responsibility, denial of injury, denial of victim, condemnation of the condemners, and 
appeal to higher loyalties. Denial of responsibility has offenders stating that they are not 
at fault. Denial of injury is the lack of recognition by off enders that anyone was harmed 
physically or emotionally by their actions. Denial of victim is similar to the denial of 
injury because it is also the lack of recognition that there was a victim, or that the victim 
was blameless. This technique is seen frequently in the justification of white collar crime 
(Benson, 1985). The technique of condemning the condemners is a shifting of focus 
from the off enders' actions to the motives or actions of the people condemning them. 
Finally, the appeal to higher loyalties occurs when the off enders state that their actions 
serve a higher purpose. 
The second theory I would like to briefly describe is Travis Hirschi' s ( 1 969) 
control theory. Although not all of Hirschi's theory is relevant to my thesis, he and 
Crelinsten (2003) make similar assumptions concerning a common belief system. 
Hirschi ( 1969) states, "The control theory assumes the existence of a common value 
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system within the society or group whose norms are being violated . . .  The question is, 
'Why does a man violate the rules in which he believes?' It is not, 'Why do men differ in 
their beliefs about what constitutes good and desirable conduct'?" (p. 23). This theme of 
a common belief system temporarily abandoned for another belief is something 
Crelinsten also addresses (see The Creation of an Alternate Reality), as do Sykes and 
Matza (1957). Like Sykes and Matza (1957), Hirschi (1969) applies his theory to 
juvenile delinquency, while Crelinsten (2003) takes a broader approach, examining the 
creation of alternate realities at the level of aggregates, including nations. 
My Contribution 
Having reviewed the historical context and the abuses that occurred at Abu 
Ghraib, I will engage in a sociological analysis on how the abuses could occur. 
Crelinsten's (2003) explanation of torture as a constructed alternate reality assists me in 
this project. Crelinsten's theoretical framework makes a contribution in pursuing an 
explanation of an often disregarded crime construct-torture. 
By tradition, criminological theories tend to explain conventional crimes, such as 
assault, rape, burglary, not torture. Torture can encompass assault, rape, and even 
murder. Further, torture is typically commissioned by aggregates and criminologists 
have not tended to explain the behavior of aggregates. Whereas mid-century 
criminologists attended to gang behavior (Miller, 1958; Cohen, 1955; Cloward and Ohlin, 
1960), criminological theories have not generally examined behaviors perpetrated by 
groups of high social status. Aggregates with power can maintain power by withholding 
information, and lack of information would certainly inhibit research. Inspired by 
Crelinsten (2003), however, my research considers how aggregates can establish the 
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conditions for an alternate reality that includes torture. In the next section I will clarify 
Crelinsten' s theory. 
The Creation of an Alternate Reality 
Crelinsten takes as a given-that most people believe that harming another person 
is generally bad. As already mentioned, this is a premise Crelinsten shares with control 
theorist Travis Hirschi ( 1 969) as well as Sykes and Matza ( 1957). Crelinsten states, 
however, that there are circumstances when most people can justify the harm inflicted on 
another person. The most obvious example of this concept according to Crelinsten is that 
of just war. Some wars are deemed as just insofar as they are allegedly fought to protect 
the basic rights of humans. World War II is a good example of just war logic. The 
United States entered World War II as a response to the Japanese invasion of Pearl 
Harbor in 1941 . Japan was considered a part of the Axis Power with Germany and Italy. 
France, the United States, Great Britain and Russia, formed the Allied Powers to fight 
against the Axis Powers. The Allied Powers, led by the United States, dropped two 
bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan. While these bombs inflicted death and long­
term damage to Japan, they were perceived by most Allied Power sympathizers as 
serving a part of a just cause: retribution. In the abstract, people may view violence as 
wrong, but once there is the perception that this harm could be serving a greater good, an 
alternate reality is created to include some use of harm. This phenomenon is akin to 
Sykes and Matza's ( 1957) appeal to higher loyalties. 
More generally, Crelinsten argues that torture is only possible because people 
create alternate realities in which torture is either accepted or permitted by ambivalence 
and/or ignorance. Crelinsten (2003) states, "This passivity [of torture] or silent 
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acquiescence on the part of the larger society allows the reality construction to spread 
into more· and more spheres of political and social life until it is sufficiently anchored in 
law, custom and discourse to define what is right and wrong, what is permissible and 
what is not" (p. 303). 
Crelinsten lists the specific processes of perpetrators to maintain an alternate 
reality: authorization, routinization and dehumanization. I will focus on perpetrators and 
proceed to discuss the three main processes by which perpetrators create alternate 
realities. 
Three Processes of Alternate Realities 
Authorization 
Authorization, in Crelinsten's (2003) model, consists of the "explicit orders, 
implicit encouragement or tacit approval by those in authority to commit torture" (p. 
300). When people perceive that they have received authorization by someone in a 
position of authority to commit a behavior outside of societal norms, such as torture, then 
they are relieved from making personal judgments or decisions. This aspect of 
Crelinsten's framework resembles Sykes and Matza's (1957) techniques of 
neutralization, denial of responsibility. 
Martha Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros, and Philip Zimbardo (2002) refer to a 
similar process that of moral disengagement. In Violence Workers (2002), Huggins, et al. 
(2002) interviewed 23 Brazilian policemen who were either direct perpetrators or indirect 
facilitators of state-sanctioned violence, to understand and reconstruct social memory. 
Huggins, et al.' s (2002) concept of moral disengagement occurred when the police 
officers were able to separate themselves morally from the torture that they committed. 
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In their study of torture by Brazilian police, Huggins, et al. refer to authorization 
as "blind obedience." While this is stronger language than Crelinsten used, Huggins, et 
al. (2002) seem to be advancing a very similar concept, as they explain, "Coercive rules 
and imposed roles prescribe and limit the behavioral options of the system's operatives. 
At every level in social and political hierarchies, obedience to superiors is demanded of 
subordinates, with subordinates in turn demanding it of those beneath them" (p. 251 ) . 
Although Crelinsten's (2003) and Huggins, et al. 's  (2002) works are very similar, their 
concepts may differ because Huggins, et al. specifically focused on state workers and 
Crelinsten generalized his theory to apply to all governments. Blind obedience is a 
fundamental aspect of military life. A soldier's life in the military is based on imposed 
roles and obedience to superiors through a chain of command. I will discuss 
authorization and blind obedience in terms of military life further in the analysis section. 
Routinization 
Crelinsten (2003) describes routinization as "[involving] the professionalization 
of those who commit torture and the supplanting of conventional moral values with those 
of obedience to authority and unquestioning acceptance of the regime's ideology" (p. 
301). Huggins, et al. (2002) parallel Crelinsten's routinization concept with their own­
that of "professionalization." They explain that professionalization includes specialized 
training, division of labor, chain of command in decision making, and working protocols. 
In other words, the use of torture is routinized by training individuals in particular 
methods of torture, creating specific jobs to carry out torturous behavior, responding to a 
set chain of responsibility for making decisions on torture, and following a protocol that 
details how to carry out specific methods of torture. 
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Huggins, et al. (2002) explain that the use of professionalization as a method of 
routinization is effective because "it would be misleading to view torture as outside 
conventional morality. One such conventional morality-professionalization-is a 
modern, secular moral ethos that includes a set of principles about right and wrong in 
which science and reason supposedly guide attitudes and conduct" (p. 208). The use of 
professionalization reflects an image of rationality and legitimacy, and therefore seems 
not so far outside of conventional morality. Although Crelinsten refers to the 
"routinization" of these tactics as socializing the perpetrators of torture, the 
"routinization" also characterizes in the transformation of society because it not only 
involves perpetrators, but victims and bystanders as well. 
Dehumanization 
Dehumanization, according to Crelinsten (2003 ), is the creation by the perpetrator 
of the perception that the victim deserves his/her fate. This process is similar to Sykes 
and Matza's (1 957) denial of victim. Sykes and Matza ( 1 957) state, "Even if the 
[perpetrator] accepts the responsibility for his deviant actions and is willing to admit that 
his deviant actions involve an injury or hurt, the moral indignation of self and others may 
be neutralized by an insistence that the injury is not wrong in light of the circumstances. 
The injury, it may be claimed, is not really an injury; rather it is a form of rightful 
retaliation or punishment" (p. 688). Because of depicted retaliation, dehumanization 
occurs frequently in times of war. 
Once again, I turn to Huggins, et al . (2002) for their conceptualization of 
dehumanization. They write: "When people are viewed . . . as less than human-restraints 
are lifted or suspended on what is permissible to do to them. We act in self-interest, 
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without concern for either their feelings or lives, without concern for any societal 
sanctions" (p. 255). Both Crelinsten (2003) and Huggins, et al. (2002) say that 
dehumanizing victims makes it easier to perpetrate harm against them. In contrast, if 
victims are seen as human, the perpetrator can relate to them and hence it is harder to 
harm them. 
A specific aspect ofdehumanizing victims is labeling (Huggins, et al., 2002; 
Crelinsten, 2003 ; Maruna and Copes, 2005). Huggins, et al. (2002) reference Hitler's use 
of labeling as dehumanization during Nazi reign. Hitler's propaganda depicted Jews and 
non-Nazis as subhuman. Jews were described as "vermin" and communists were 
described as "insanely destructive" (Huggins, et al., 2002). Hitler's regime was not the 
- only one using subhuman propaganda to dehumanize the enemy. During World War II, 
U.S. propaganda portrayed images of Japanese as rats and the Nazis as gorillas (Dower, 
1 986). Although these are blatant examples of dehumanization of the victim-the victim 
as presented as an animal-perhaps we have learned from that and have moved on to a 
more discreet form of dehumanization: depicting the victim as simply different from us, 
as we have with "enemy combatants." 
Labels create an ''us versus them" mentality. Crelinsten argues that the "us versus 
them" mentality is mainly disseminated by the mass media. He also states that if the 
perceived enemy includes constructed classifications such as "radical extremists" or 
"violent insurgents," then the threat of the enemy becomes more compelling. Crelinsten 
states that the more different the ''them" is from the "us," the more believable the threat 
IS. 
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An example of this form of dehumanization was the 1994 Rwandan genocide 
between the majority Hutus and the minority Tutsis. The Hutus and Tutsis were actually 
very similar ethnically; they both spoke the same language and followed the same 
traditions. When the Belgians colonized Rwanda in 1916, however, they saw distinctions 
between the two groups. The Belgians required the Hutus and Tutsis to carry 
identification cards according to their ethnic dissent. The Belgians saw the Tutsis as 
superior to the Hutus, and assigned privileges accordingly. Thus, the Tutsis enjoyed 
better jobs and better education than the Hutus. This distinction, initiated by the 
Belgians, remains to this day and was a primary contribution to the recent genocide of the 
Tutsis by the Hutus. (BBC News, 2004). A memo issued by Colonel Deogratias 
Nsabimana, chief of staff for the Hutu party, defined the enemy as ''the Tutsi inside or 
outside the country, extremist and nostalgic for power, who have NEVER recognized and 
will NEVER recognize the realities of the 1959 social revolution and who wish to 
reconquer power by all means necessary, including arms" [ emphasis in original 
document] (Human Rights Watch, 1999: 1 ). Referring to the Tutsis as "extremist and 
nostalgic for power," Nsabimana built on a separation between the Hutus and the Tutsis. 
While the situation at Abu Ghraib was not genocide, a distinction was certainly made that 
the victims were different than the perpetrators. I develop this idea further in the 
analysis. 
Alternate Realities in an Open Society 
Crelinsten argues that in open societies, where the media go relatively uncensored 
and citizens are allowed to question the government, the alternate reality must be 
introduced in subtle ways, meaning gradually. He claims that people can only deny what 
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they perceive and understand and if the alternate reality is introduced subtly so that no 
one is able to perceive it, no one is able to question it. 
Crelinsten explains that in open societies, there are certainly ambiguous areas 
between the traditional reality (torture is bad) and the alternative reality (torture is 
acceptable). Crelinsten's uses a metaphor to demonstrate this ambiguous area between 
the original reality and the alternate reality. Crelinsten states, "One can only deny what 
one is aware of in the first place. As such, there are gradations or grey areas between the 
realities that sustain torture and related atrocities and those that sustain more conventional 
morality" (Crelinsten, 2003 :298). Crelinsten's use of the color metaphor is symbolic of 
ambiguous conditions created by the aggregate to create a climate more conducive to 
torture. Crelinsten is referring to a continuum of grey areas within alternate realities. In 
an open society, citizens can actively question their government, but the grey areas make 
questioning more difficult. 
Three Roles in the Use of Torture 
Crelinsten identifies three roles in the use of torture: the perpetrators, the victims, 
and the bystanders. I have focused on perpetrators, and their use of three processes to aid 
in justifying the use of torture: authorization, routinization, and dehumanization. Here I 
briefly discuss the other two roles. 
Victims at the domestic level of torture are generally minorities, disadvantaged 
economically or politically or both. Crelinsten notes that if these minofities are 
associated with violent insurgents or terrorism, the installation of a torturous regime is 
easier because it is easier to apply the label of "enemy" to violent insurgents or terrorists. 
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Crelinsten explains that the definition of the enemy by "the regime" is often broadened to 
include sympathizers with the victims in the enemy category. 
Finally, bys�ders aid in the construction of the alternate reality through apathy 
and tolerance. Bystanders may not necessarily condone the torturous behavior but by not 
openly opposing it, the alternate reality continues. Crelinsten lists three ideas with which 
bystanders justify the use of torture : just world, denial, and repression. The just world 
framework, described earlier, justifies the use of torture by constructing victims as 
deserving this treatment. Denial is the idea that the torture would never be perpetrated 
against the bystanders. Finally, repression occurs when the bystanders suppress of any 
emotion related to the perpetration of torture (Crelinsten, 2003). 
Fore ground and Background: The Conditions for Sharing an Alternate Reality 
Jack Katz ( 1988) says that criminologists should focus on the foreground of 
off ending behavior rather than just the background. The foreground pertains to the 
qualities of the crime while the background perta_ins to the social environment of the 
perpetrators. Katz's distinction between the two is useful, and I concur that 
criminologists should study both. In the case of Abu Ghraib, both the foreground and the 
background were essential in facilitating conditions for the emergence of an alternate 
reality. At Abu Ghraib, the foreground was the soldiers' participation in the abuses while 
the background was the military and executive branch's bureaucratic acquiescence in the 
abuses. 
Fore ground: The Conditions for the Soldiers ' Alternate Reality 
Facilitating conditions for the production of an alternate reality were the 
following three processes : authorization, routinization, and dehumanization (Crelinsten, 
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2003). To believe in a successful alternate reality, the soldiers had to convince 
themselves that the torture they were committing was within societal norms. Given the 
classified nature of most first-person accounts, I have limited data on the verbal 
neutralizations of the soldiers. I can, however, make inferences about the participation of 
soldiers by interpreting how pictures of the abuses committed at Abu Ghraib eventually 
became public. After committing the abuses, some of the soldiers transmitted pictures of 
themselves standing with the abused victims via cell phone to family members back in 
the United States. 
Most of the accounts of the victims are still classified, but MSNBC, a television 
news network, gained access to some of the statements released by the detainees at Abu 
Ghraib. Some of the accounts given by the victims describe how the soldiers perpetrated 
the torture against them. Some specifically describe the photographs taken of the abuses. 
When questioned about the photographs taken of the abuses, Hiadar Sabar Abed Miktub 
al-Aboodi, detainee No. 1 3077 said, "They forced us to walk like dogs on our hands and 
knees. And we had to bark like a dog, and ifwe didn't do that they started hitting us hard 
on our face and chest with no mercy. After that, they took us to our cells, took the 
mattresses out and dropped water on the floor and they made us sleep on our stomachs on 
the floor with the bags on our head and they took pictures of everything" (Higham and 
Stephens, 2004a: 1 ). 
Background: The Conditions/or the Bureaucracy's Alternate Reality 
Peter Berger and Thomas Luclcmann said, "He who has the bigger stick has the 
better chance of imposing his definitions of reality" (1 966: 1 09). Bureaucracies can 
condition the people under their authority to participate in the realities that they create 
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(Weber, 192111968). Crelinsten explains that the imposition of a bureaucracy's 
definitions of reality can occur both gradually and suddenly, but it is more likely that a 
gradual implementation of the conditions of an alternate reality will go unquestioned. 
Bureaucracies as aggregates neutralize through the same processes that individuals do: 
authorization, routinization, and dehumanization (Crelinsten, 2003). Bureaucracies, 
however, bear a somewhat different relationship to these processes. Generally, 
bureaucracies direct these processes by setting policies. If framed in vague or ambiguous 
language, bureaucracies convey tolerance for harmful conduct that is not explicitly 
named as forbidden (Weber, 1921/1968). In the analysis, I address both the foreground 
and the background facilitating conditions of an alternate reality. 
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·V. ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
This project is exemplary, not exhaustive. It serves as a demonstration of a part 
of Crelinsten's framework that is evident in the abuses at Abu Ghraib. Since alternative 
realities are abstract, arguably no one can ascertain that they exist. We can, however, 
determine if facilitating conditions exist. I demonstrate some particular aspects of the 
Abu Ghraib abuses and relate them to Crelinsten's (2003) conditions for torture. 
Specific examples of the conditions conducive to the creation of an alternate 
reality are organized according to two types of perpetrators : the soldiers and the 
bureaucracy. As discussed previously, these two perpetrator groups correspond with a 
"foreground" and a "background" of torture at Abu Ghraib. 
Fore ground: The Soldiers as Perpetrators 
Authorization 
Recall that the authorization of torture is the explicit order or at least official 
tolerance of acts of torture. Indeed, at Abu Ghraib, the soldiers were responding to the 
authorization from their superior officers to interrogate the "unlawful combatants" in an 
aggressive manner. 
Harvey J. Volzer, attorney for Meghan Ambuhl, a soldier who was accused of 
participating in the abuses, stated, "If you're there, you're going to see what's going on. If 
you're Private England or these two specialists, what in the hell are you supposed to do? 
You know that Military Intelligence is telling the people above you what to do" (Scelfo, 
2004:1 ). Taking Volzer as a representative or proxy for Ambuhl, Volzer's statement 
reflects Sykes and Matza's (1 957) neutralization technique, denial of responsibility. 
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Sykes and Matza (1957) explained this technique as the process of transferring 
responsibility onto someone or something else. In the case of Abu Ghraib, the soldiers 
denied responsibility to the extent that stated that they were obeying orders from their 
commanding officers. This technique of neutralization coincides with Crelinsten's 
(2003) authorization process because the denial of responsibility often refers to obeying 
orders from a person perceived to be in authority. 
Private Lynndie England, a better known female soldier accused of abusing 
detainees, stated, "I was instructed by persons in higher rank to stand there and hold this 
leash and look at the camera," in reference to the photographs taken of her standing next 
to a leashed detainee (CBS/AP, 2004:1 ). England also stated, "To all of us who have 
been charged, we all agree that we don't feel like we were doing things that we weren't 
supposed to, because we were told to do them. We think everything was justified, 
because we were instructed to do this and to do that" (CBS/AP, 2004:1). Similar to 
Volzer, England indicated that she was obedient to those in authority. 
Some of the soldiers perceived silence from the administration on interrogation 
tactics as authorization to use some tactics that were actually never approved. For 
example, Specialist Sabrina D. Harman, a soldier accused of photographing and 
participating in the abuses of detainees at Abu Ghraib, said . that she was never informed 
about the Geneva Conventions and what they stated regarding the humane treatment of 
detainees. Harman was quoted by The Washington Post as stating, "The Geneva 
Conventions were never posted, and none of us remember taking a class to review it. The 
first time reading it was two months after being charged" (Spinner, 2004: A0 l }. Harman 
was effectively allowed to participate in torturous behavior because she was unaware that 
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the United States was bound by international law to treat detainees humanely in all 
circumstances-a commitment that Rumsfeld had reaffirmed symbolically in a memo to 
be distributed to military personnel on April 16, 2003. Her attention to only what was 
explicitly instructed or prohibited of her reflects the foundation of torture in 
"authorization." 
Private Charles Graner stated his perception that the abuses were authorized 
through orders he received from commanding officers. During his trial, Graner stated 
that his lieutenant told him, "If [ military intelligence] asks you to do this, it needs to be 
done. They're in charge, follow their orders . . .  At the time my understanding is that they 
[the treatment of the detainees] were [lawful], or I wouldn't have done them" (Graner, 
2005: 1 ). By telling Graner not to question the authority of commanding officers even if 
what they were suggesting seemed wrong to Graner, the lieutenant "authorized" him to 
submit to those with perceived power. 
Routinization 
Recall that routinization is the professionalization of the people who commit 
torture. Journalist Seymour Hersh reported that Sergeant Javal Davis, a soldier accused 
of abuse, did question the abuses but the response he received was that this was the 
proper manner in which to handle the detainees. Hersh quoted Davis as stating, "I 
witnessed prisoners in the MI hold section . . .  being made to do various things that I 
would question morally . . .  We were told that they had different rules . . .  The MI staffs to 
my understanding have been giving Graner compliments . . .  statements like, 'Good job, 
they're breaking down real fast. They answer every question. They're giving out good 
information" (Hersh, April 30, 2004:1). This affirmation is an example of routinization 
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because a system of rewards and punishments condition the perpetrators to continue the 
torture (Crelinsten, 2003:301 ). Davis perceived that Graner was receiving affirmation 
that his treatment of the detainees was not only authorized but encouraged. 
When he was questioned as to why he did not report the abuses that he allegedly 
thought were "morally" wrong, Dayis replied, "Because I assumed that if they were 
doing things out of the ordinary or outside the guidelines, someone would have said 
something. Also the wing [ where the abuses occurred] belongs to MI and it appeared MI 
personnel approved of the abuse" (Hersh, April 30, 2004:1 ). In the wing where the 
abuses occurred, MI supposedly was in control and therefore controlled what behavior 
was appropriate with the detainees. 
As mentioned earlier, routinization can also be seen in the division of labor as 
legitimatizing the use of torture. In the concentration camps of Nazi Germany, some 
soldiers would gather the victims, some would place them on the train, some would take 
them to the "showers" to be executed, would collect the shoes from the bodies, and some 
would take the bodies to the incinerator (Bamavi, 1992). This division of labor created a 
separation between the perpetrator and the system of torture. It is an example of 
Huggins, et al.' s (2002) concept, the professionalization of torture. While Abu Ghraib 
was not a concentration camp, there was a division of labor between the Military 
Intelligence (MI) and the Military Police (MP). 
At Abu Ghraib, the MPs were in charge of guarding the detainees while the Mis 
were in charge of interrogating them. For example, Private Lynndie England told 
investigators, "MI had told us to 'rough them' up to get answers from the prisoners" 
(Higham and Stephens, 2004b: 1 ). Stephanie Harman, another soldier accused of abuses 
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at Abu Ghraib, stated in a sworn statement, "It is [Graner] and Frederick's job to do 
things for MI and OGA [ other government agencies] to get these people to talk" (Fuoco, 
et al., May 8, 2004: 1 ). While no guidelines exist outlining the protocol for MP and MI 
relationships within a MP detention facility, there was a clear division of labor between 
the two groups (Schlesinger, 2004). The division oflabor, as a part of the process of 
routinization, allowed the soldiers to separate themselves from the system of torture. 
To military personnel, war is a legitimized event. In other words, a soldier's job 
description might include fighting in a war. War itself.-and all that it might entail-is 
professionalized. An example of this process is found in Private Lynndie England's 
explanation as to why she participated in the abuses. She told a reporter, "I guess it just 
goes with stuff that happens during war time ... You know, going in and interrogating, and 
doing what you're told." England emphasized the fact that the abusive behavior occurred 
within the confines of war. Since the abuses occurred during wartime, they are more 
easily justified than if they had occurred during peacetime. 
Dehumanization 
As discussed earlier, modem history reflects a shift away from dehumanizing by 
referring to the victim as subhuman to referring to the victim as different than the 
perpetrators. Recall, Crelinsten (2003) refers to this as an ''us versus them" mentality. 
Perhaps President Bush set the precedent for separating "us" from "them" in his 
address to the nation of the eve of declaring the "War on Terror." He stated, "The 
enemies you confront will come to know your skill and bravery. The people you liberate 
will witness the honorable and decent spirit of the American military. In this conflict, 
America faces an enemy who has no regard for conventions of war or rules of morality" 
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(2003: 1 ). By appealing first to the "skill and bravery" and the "honorable and decent 
spirit" of the American military, President Bush established that the American military is 
collectively a morally good entity. He then refers to the enemy "who has no regard for 
the conventions of war or rules of morality." In this statement Bush implies that while 
the American military is moral, the enemies that it is fighting are not. 
For another example of the "us/them" mentality (Crelinsten, 2003), recall 
President Bush's statement cited in the sub-section, A New Kind of War. Bush referred to 
starkly opposing differences between the American and the Iraqi ideologies. He stated 
that Hussein's mindset was that of "tyranny and murder" while the American mindset 
was of "liberty and life" (Bush, May 24, 2004). By emphasizing the difference between 
the two ideologies, a separation was created between us and them. 
When referring to the detainees who were being held at Abu Ghraib, Guy 
Womack, Charles Graner's attorney, said that they were "not just some guys you find 
standing out front of a Dairy Queen" (Kirsch, January 12, 2005:1 ). By this statement, 
Womack, on behalf of Graner, distanced the victims from the perpetrators. If the victims 
had been "guys you find standing out front of a Dairy Queen" it would have been more 
difficult, or less defensible, to torture them because Graner could have related to them 
more easily. Like Bush's statement regarding the enemy being immoral, Womack's 
statement created distance between the perpetrators and the victims. The separation of 
the perpetrator from the victim allows for a denial of victim (Sykes and Matza, 1957) to 
occur. 
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Background: The Bureaucracy as Perpetrators 
The same three key processes ·apply to the bureaucracy as the perpetrator: 
authorization, routinization, and dehumanization. In this case, the bureaucracy is the 
American government and military command. Recall that the background consists of the 
social environment of the perpetrators (Katz, 1988). The bureaucracy acts as the social 
environment by creating an atmosphere conducive to torture. 
Authorization 
Tables 1 -3 give the chronological order that interrogation techniques were 
authorized at Guantanamo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. After reviewing the order of 
authorization, it will be easier to examine how the authorization of the interrogation 
tactics contributed to the conditions necessary for the creation of an alternate reality. 
As shown in Tables 1 through 3, the interrogation techniques authorized at Guantanamo, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq all initially followed Field Manual 34-52 exclusively. Field 
Manual 34-52 provides military guidelines for interrogation procedures last updated in 
1992 (Jacques, 2005). While Field Manual 34-52 has been widely used and accepted as 
an appropriate set of guidelines, it does not list specific authorized techniques. Rather, it 
addresses in a more general manner the behaviors expected and not expected from 
interrogators. Field Manual 34-52 strongly discourages the use of physical force to 
obtain information from prisoners. The manual states, "The use of force, mental torture, 
threats, insults, or exposure to unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is 
prohibited by law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the U.S. Government. 
Experience indicates that the use of force is not necessary to gain the cooperation of 
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· Table 1 :  INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED FOR GUANTANAMO BAY (2002) 
Date January 2002 December 2, 2002 
Effective 
Protocol Field Manual 34-52 Category II and III techniques 
Authorized Anny Protocol Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
By: 
Description While Field Manual 34-52 does not lay out explicit interrogation Category II: 
techniques, the manual uses more general suggestions in (1) The use of stress positions (like 
interrogation prisoners. Field Manual 34-52 states, standing) for a maximum of four 
"The use of force, mental torture, threats, insults, or exposure to hours. 
unpleasant and inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited by (2) The use of falsified documents or 
law and is neither authorized nor condoned by the U.S. reports. 
Government. Experience indicates that the use of force is not (3) Use of the isolation facility for up 
necessary to gain the cooperation of sources for interrogation. to 30 days. Request must be made 
Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields through the OIC [Officer In Charge], 
unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and Interrogation Section, to the Director, 
can induce the source to say whatever he thin.ks the interrogator Joint Interrogation Group (JIG). 
wants to hear. However, the use of force is not to be confused Extensions beyond the initial 30 days 
with psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or other nonviolent and must be approved by 
noncoercive ruses used by the interrogator in questioning hesitant Commanding General. For selected 
or uncooperative sources. detainees, the OIC, Interrogation 
The psychological techniques and principles outlined should Section, will approve all contacts with 
neither be confused with, nor construed to be synonymous with, the detainee, to include medical visits 
unauthorized techniques such as brainwashing, mental torture, or of a non-emergent nature. 
any other form of mental coercion to include drugs. These (4) Interrogating the detainee in an 
techniques and principles are intended to serve as guides in environment other than the standard 
obtaining the willing cooperation of a source. The absence of interrogation booth. 
threats in interrogation is intentional, as their enforcement and (5) Deprivation of light and auditory 
use normally constitute violations of international law and may stimuli. 
result in prosecution under the UCMJ. (6) The detainee may also have a hood 
Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat of violence or placed over his head during 
force renders an interrogator ineffective should the source transportation and questioning. The 
challenge the threat. Consequently, from both legal and moral hood shall not restrict breathing in any 
viewpoints, the restrictions established by international law, way and the detainee should be under 
agreements, and customs render threats of force, violence, and direct observation when hooded. 
deprivation useless as interrogation techniques" (1 992, Chapter (7) The use of 20-hour interrogations. 
1 :2) (8) Removal of all comfort items 
(including religious items). 
(9) Switching the detainees from hot 
rations to MREs. 
(10) Removal of clothing. 
( 1 1 ) Forced grooming (shaving of 
facial hair, etc.). 
( 12) Using detainees' individual 
phobias (such as fear of dogs) to induce 
stress (Phifer, October 1 1 , 2002:2). 
Category Ill: 
"The use of mild, non-injurious 
physical contact such as grabbing, 
poking in the chest with the finger, and 
light pushing" (Haynes, November 27, 
2002: 1) 
44 
Table 1 (cont.) 
Date January IS, 2003 March 6, 2003 April 1 6, 2003 
Effective 
Protocol Category II and Ill techniques 35 Revised techniques 24 of 35 accepted 
submitted to Rumsfeld for techniques 
approval 
Authorized Secretary of Defense Donald U.S. Air Force Commander Secretary of Defense 
By: Rumsfeld General Counsel MarY Walker Donald Rumsfeld 
Description Category II and III techniques ( I )  Direct (I) Direct 
were rescinded on the advice of (2) Incentive/Removal of (2) Incentive/Removal of 
General Counsel of the Incentive Incentive 
Department of the Navy, Alberto (3) Emotional Love (3) Emotional Love 
J. Mora (4) Emotional hate (4) Emotional hate 
(S) Fear Up Harsh (S) Fear Up Harsh 
(6) Fear Up Mild (6) Fear Up Mild 
(7) Reduced Fear (7) Reduced Fear 
(8) Pride and Ego Up (8) Pride and Ego Up 
(9) Pride and Ego Down (9) Pride and Ego Down 
( 10) Futility ( 10) Futility 
(1 1 )  We Know All ( 1 1 )  We Know All 
( 12) Establish Your Identity ( 12) Establish Your 
( 1 3) Repetition Approach Identity 
(14) File and Dossier ( 13) Repetition Approach 
( 15) Mutt and Jeff (14) File and Dossier 
( 16) Rapid Fire (15) Mutt and Jeff 
(17) Silence ( 16) Rapid Fire 
( 18) Change of Scenery Up (17) Silence 
( 19) Change of Scenery Down ( 1 8) Change of Scenery Up 
(20) Hooding ( 19) Change of Scenery 
(2 1) Mild Physical Contact Down 
(22) Dietary Manipulation (20) Dietary Manipulation 
(23) Environmental (2 1 )  Environmental 
Manipulation Manipulation 
(24) Sleep Adjustment (22) Sleep Adjustment 
(25) False Flag (23) False Flag 
(26) Threat of Transfer (24) Isolation 
(27) Isolation (Rumsfeld, 2003: 1 -2) 
(28) Use of Prolonged 
Interrogations 
(29) Forced Grooming 
(30) Prolonged Standing 
(3 1) Sleep Deprivation 
(32) Physical Training 
(33) Face Slap/Stomach Slap 
(34) Removal of Clothing 
(35) Increasing Anxiety by 
Use of A versions 
(Walker, 2003 :7 1-73) 
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Tabl� 2 :  INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED FOR AFGHANISTAN 
(2001-2003) 
Date Effective October 200 1-December 2002 January 24, 2003 February 27, 2003 
Protocol Field Manual 34-52 Category II and III Revision of five 
techniques techniques not consistent 
with Field Manual 34-52 
Authorized Anny Protocol CJTF- 180 Acting 1 CJTF-1 80 Commander, 
By: Staff Judge Lieutenant General Dan K. 
Advocate McNeil 
Description While Field Manual 34-52 does not lay out The CJTF- 1 80 This memo addressed five 
explicit interrogation techniques, the Acting Staff Judge techniques (the specifics 
manual uses more general suggestions in Advocate drafted a are still classified) that 
interrogation prisoners. Field Manual 34- memorandum that were believed to be 
52 states, was sent to involved in 2 detainee 
"The use of force, mental torture, threats, CENTCOM Staff deaths in December 2002. 
insults, or exposure to unpleasant and Judge Advocate These five techniques were 
inhumane treatment of any kind is outlining the either modified or 
prohibited by law and is neither authorized interrogation eliminated as a 
nor condoned by the U.S. Government. techniques in precautionary action 
Experience indicates that the use of force practice in (Jacques, 2005). 
is not necessary to gain the cooperation of Afghanistan. 
sources for interrogation. Therefore, the According to the 
use of force is a poor technique, as it yields Executive Summary 
unreliable results, may damage subsequent by the Department 
collection efforts, and can induce the of Defense (2005), 
source to say whatever he thinks the these techniques 
interrogator wants to hear. However, the closely resembled 
use of force is not to be confused with those techniques 
psychological ploys, verbal trickery, or listed in the 
other nonviolent and noncoercive ruses December 2, 2002 
used by the interrogator in questioning memo regarding the 
hesitant or uncooperative sources. Category II and III 
The psychological techniques and techniques 
principles outlined should neither be employed at 
confused with, nor construed to .be Guantanamo. 
synonymous with, unauthorized techniques Recall, these were 
such as brainwashing, mental torture, or later rescinded by 
any other form of mental coercion to Rumsfeld. 
include drugs. These techniques and 
principles are intended to serve as guides 
in obtaining the willing cooperation of a 
source. The absence of threats in 
interrogation is intentional, as their 
enforcement and use normally constitute 
violations of international law and may 
result in prosecution under the U CMJ. 
Additionally, the inability to carry out a 
threat of violence or force renders an 
interrogator ineffective should the source 
challenge the threat. Consequently, from 
both legal and moral viewpoints, the 
restrictions established by international 
law, agreements, and customs render 
threats of force, violence, and deprivation 
useless as interrogation techniques" ( 1992, 
Chapter I :2) 
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Table 2 (cont.) 
Date March 2004 June 2004 
Effective 
Protocol Revised interrogation techniques Field Manual 34-52 
Authorized CJTF- 1 80 CENTCOM Commander, General John Abizaid 
By: 
Description According to the Department of General Abizaid ordered that all interrogations techniques be 
Defense's Executive Summary, these standardized to one policy. The policy adopted relies nearly 
revised guidelines revived some of the exclusively on the procedures laid out by Field Manual 34-52 
techniques that had previously been (Jacques, 2005). 
rescinded on February 27, 2003. 
Additionally, "Some of techniques in the 
new guidance were based upon an 
unsigned draft memorandum from the 
Secretary of Defense to CENTCOM 
(prepared by the Joint Staff) that was 
substantively identical to the Secretary's 
April 16, 2003 interrogation policy for 
GTMO" (2005:7). 
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Table 3: INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES AUTHORIZED FOR IRAQ, 
INCLUDING ABU GRHAIB (2003-Present) 
Date March 1 9, 2003 September 14, October 1 2, 2003 May 13,  2004 
Effective 2003 to Present 
Protocol Field Manual 34-52 CJTF-7 Revision of Revision of 
Interrogation CJTF-7 CJTF-7 
policy for Iraq Interrogation Interrogation 
oolicv for Irao oolicv for Iraq 
Authorized Army Protocol CJTF-7 CENTCOM's CJTF-7 
By: Commander, Staff Judge 
Lieutenant Advocate 
General Ricardo 
Sanchez 
Description While Field Manual 34-52 does not lay out The CJTF-7 The According to 
explicit interrogation techniques, the manual interrogation CENTCOM's the Executive 
uses more general suggestions in interrogation policy was Staff Judge Summary of 
prisoners. Field Manual 34-52 states, heavily Advocate the 
"The use of force, mental torture, threats, influenced by the reviewed the Department of 
insults, or exposure to unpleasant and April 16, 2003 policy as drafted Defense was, 
inhumane treatment of any kind is prohibited memo which by Lieutenant "The list of 
by law and is neither authorized nor condoned outlined General Ricardo approved 
by the U.S. Government. Experience interrogation Sanchez and techniques 
indicates that the use of force is not necessary techniques to be found it "overly remained 
to gain the cooperation of sources for used at aggressive" identical to the 
interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a Guantanamo (Jacques, October 2003 
poor technique, as it yields unreliable results, Bay. This memo 2005:8). After policy; the 
may damage subsequent collection efforts, was brought to the revisions, the principal 
and can induce the source to say whatever he Iraq by Military policy closely change from 
thinks the interrogator wants to hear. General Miller resembled the previous 
However, the use of force is not to be on a visit. This guidelines policy was to 
confused with psychological ploys, verbal policy also outlined in Field specify that 
trickery, or other nonviolent and noncoercive included some Manual 34-52. under no 
ruses used by the interrogator in questioning techniques being The Department circumstances 
hesitant or uncooperative sources. employed in of Defense's would requests 
The psychological techniques and principles Afghanistan Executive for the use of 
outlined should neither be confused with, nor (Jacques, 2005). Summary stated, certain 
construed to be synonymous with, "It should be techniques be 
unauthorized techniques such as noted that none approved" 
brainwashing, mental torture, or any other of the techniques (2005 :8). 
form of mental coercion to include drugs. contained in 
These techniques and principles are intended either the 
to serve as guides in obtaining the willing September or 
cooperation of a source. The absence of October 2003 
threats in interrogation is intentional, as their CJTF-7 
enforcement and use normally constitute interrogation 
violations of international law and may result policies would 
in prosecution under the UCMJ. have permitted 
Additionally, the inability to carry out a threat abuses such as 
of violence or force renders an interrogator those at Abu 
ineffective should the source challenge the Ghraib" 
threat. Consequently, from both legal and (2005:8). 
moral viewpoints, the restrictions established 
by international law, agreements, and customs 
render threats of force, violence, and 
deprivation useless as interrogation 
techniques" ( 1 992, Chapter 1 :2) 
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sources for interrogation. Therefore, the use of force is a poor technique, as it yields 
unreliable results, may damage subsequent collection efforts, and can induce the source 
to say whatever he thinks the interrogator wants to hear" ( 1992:2). The Manual 
discourages use of force for instrumental reasons, and not because it is wrong per se. 
Because Field Manual 34-52 only provided general guidelines for interrogating 
detainees rather than specific protocols, the interrogation techniques used at all three 
locations- Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq-were open to the interpretation of 
commanding officers (Jacques, 2005). This ambiguity would present a problem in an 
environment as highly structured as the military. Because protocol exists for almost 
every behavior in the military, Field Manual 34-52, which was open to interpretation, 
would cause confusion and prompted creative techniques perceived as legitimate 
according to the Manual. Indeed, in the Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review 
Department of Defense Detention Operations, Chairman James R. Schlesinger (2004) 
stated, "The policy memos promulgated at the CJTF-7 level allowed for interpretation in 
several areas and did not adequately set forth the limits of interrogation techniques. The 
existence of confusing and inconsistent interrogation technique policies contributed to the 
belief that additional interrogation techniques were condoned" (p. 9). 
Another example of authorization as a condition of the creation of an alternate 
reality was when Rumsfeld briefly authorized the use of Category II and III techniques in 
Afghanistan on January 24, 2003. Although these techniques of interrogation were later 
found to be in violation of Field Manual 34-52 and thus rescinded, the authorization of 
these techniques at all, even if it was only for a few weeks, led soldiers to believe that 
these techniques were approved. 
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The Tables clearly show that the interrogation techniques were revised several 
times, often within a very short period of time. For example, there was a significant shift 
in less than a month's time of interrogation techniques approved by Rumsfeld (Table 3, 
September 14, 2003 and October 1 2, 2003). The frequent revisions added to the 
confusion of what techniques were authorized at any particular time. Even though the 
Department of Defense' s  summary said that frequent revision to the approved 
interrogation techniques did not cause the abuses suffered at Abu Ghraib (Jacques, 2005), 
Fay's (2004) report indicted the frequency of revisions by stating, "Theater Interrogation 
and Counter-Resistance Policies were found to be poorly defined, and changed several 
times. As a result, interrogation activities sometimes crossed into abusive activity . . .  " (p. 
1 1 0). Fay's explanation of why the abuses occurred coincides with Crelinsten' s  
framework regarding authorization as a condition of the creation of an alternate reality. 
The Abu Ghraib example extends Crelinsten' s discussion, however, in highlighting the 
role of inconsistent authorization. Inconsistency can be taken as authorization itself. 
Routinization 
Recall that Crelinsten refers to routinization as the professionalization of those 
who commit torture and the routine occurrence of torture so that it is normalized. For 
example, consider the terminology used for the detainees. President Bush and his 
advisors decided that members of the Taliban and Al Qaeda were "unlawful combatants" 
and would not be considered prisoners of war. The terminology prevented the detainees 
from receiving rights outlined in the Geneva Conventions for prisoners of war 
(Schlesinger, 2004). 
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Because the term "unlawful combatant" had never been officially used in any 
other war before, no protocol existed on how to treat the unlawful combatants. Because 
of the new terminology, the bureaucracy purportedly had to establish new protocol for 
how to treat unlawful combatants. The routine referral of the detainees as unlawful 
combatants created the condition of routinization as explained by Crelinsten, especially in 
open societies, such as the United States, where the conditions for the creation of an 
alternate reality must occur subtly and in complex ways. 
Ambiguous or vague language by the bureaucracy also enabled "transcendence" 
from generally held norms (Hastings and Vernon, 1971). For example, recall that 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated in regard to treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay, 
"I reiterate that U.S. Armed Forces shall continue to treat detainees humanely and, to the 
extent appropriate and consistent with military necessity, in a manner consistent with the 
principles of the Geneva Conventions" (Rumsfeld, April 16, 2003: 1 ). When he used the 
expressions, "to the extent appropriate" and "military necessity," Rumsfeld indicated that 
the soldiers would have to use some discretion on what that "extent" and that "necessity" 
were. If no one knew precisely what was meant by these terms, they were open to 
interpretation. 
Additionally, and more generally, when a bureaucracy professionalizes the use of 
torture through policies, training, and regulations, the process is perceived by the 
perpetrators as authorized and therefore legitimated by bureaucratic norms (Huggins, et 
al., 2002). The policies authorized by Rumsfeld and other military officials 
professionalized the more aggressive techniques. While some of the interrogation 
techniques were rescinded, they were in effect for a short period of time during which 
5 1  
they were used on detainees. The routine authorization of more aggressive interrogation 
techniques conditioned the soldiers to perceive the techniques as authorized and 
acceptable, and therefore led to minimal challenging of them. 
Dehumanization 
Similar to the dehumanization techniques employed by the soldiers, the 
bureaucracy as an aggregate also works to dehumanize the enemy. An example of 
dehumanization in the context of Abu Ghraib was the bureaucracy's use of the term 
"unlawful combatant" instead of prisoner of war (Schlesinger, 2004). Since members of 
the Taliban and Al Qaeda were considered "unlawful combatants" instead of "prisoners 
of war," President Bush and his advisors determined that they were not necessarily 
entitled to the humane treatment outlined in the Geneva Conventions specifically for 
prisoners of war (Schlesinger, 2004). A semantic change paved the way for a policy 
change. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Discussion 
Inspired by Crelinsten (2003) framework, I have examined the facilitating 
conditions that would produce an alternate reality conducive to torture. Both the soldiers 
and the bureaucracy-that is, the military leaders and executive branch of the United 
States--participated as perpetrators at Abu Ghraib through authorization, routinization, 
and dehumanization. Hopefully, by recognizing the processes of the construction of an 
alternate reality that includes torture, we can prevent torture in the future. 
The prevention of torture requires the deconstruction of the alternate reality by all 
those involved in its sphere of influence, the perpetrators, victims and bystanders. It 
occurs when people recognize that there is an alternate reality and can stop the spread of 
its influence. 
A factor contributing to the creation of an alternate reality which includes torture 
can involve the enlarging of who is considered the enemy. Enlarging the enemy simply 
means broadening the scope of who is considered the enemy. Huggins, et al. (2002) 
gives an example in their book Violence Workers. In reference to the training process of 
Brazilian police, they explain that the police cadets' instructors tell them that danger is 
ubiquitous such that their enemy can literally be anyone. This technique caused the 
police officers to be skeptical of everyone. 
John Jacques (2005) refers to the enlargement of the enemy in the Department of 
Defense's Executive Summary in its discussion of gaining intelligence through 
interrogations by stating, "Human intelligence, or HUMINT - of which interrogation is 
an indispensable component - has taken on increasing importance as we face an enemy 
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that blends in with the civilian population and operates in the shadows" (p. 1 ). This type 
of rhetoric implies that the enemy could be anyone, not just terrorists. Jacques' statement 
that the enemy "blends in with the civilian population" clearly broadens the scope of who 
is considered the enemy. Recognizing that the enlargement of enemies is occurring and 
stopping the spread of its influence is one step in preventing torture. 
Critique 
Crelinsten's (2003) framework is derivative, though not explicitly so, of other 
sociological schemes. Crelinsten's sociological forbears provided tools for understanding 
the conditions conducive to the creation of a shared reality that includes torture. With an 
eye toward preventing, we would do well to turn to more specific theories focusing on the 
construction of bureaucracies (Weber, 1921/1968). Even though Weber does not address 
torture, often torture is state-sanctioned and therefore a look into how bureaucracies work 
would help in understanding the inclusion of torture by a bureaucracy. 
An examination of the body of literature on the "Just World Hypothesis" (Lerner, 
1981) would prove fruitful in evaluating how some people believe that torture is justified 
because the victims somehow deserve this treatment. The Just World Hypothesis helps 
people believe that the world makes sense, which Lerner ( 198 1) implies is universal. Yet 
it remains the case that in many circumstances many people do not justify mistreatment 
on deserving grounds. What are those conditions? It behooves us to ask. 
On a micro level, we would do well to tum to Sykes and Matza' s ( 1957) 
techniques of neutralization. While Crelinsten's (2003) framework focuses on a macro 
explanation of how torture occurs, Sykes and Matza offer a theory for how individuals 
neutralize deviant behavior. Sykes and Matza do not specifically address torture, but I 
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think that their framework would be useful for impeding the neutralization of torture (see 
Maruna and Copes [2005] for a recent review). 
I was attracted to Crelin�ten's (2003) framework because he was unique in his 
, usage of the term torture. While most criminologists shy away from discussing torture, 
Crelinsten makes a contribution to criminology by addressing how torture occurs via the 
construction of alternate realities. Crelinsten's framework could have been made 
stronger by referencing the body of literature by other sociologists and criminologists 
who had conducted research in areas pertaining to his work (Weber, 1921/1968; Sykes 
and Matza, 1957; Lerner, 1981 ). 
A Proposal for Future Research 
Given the time parameters and the limited scope of this project, certainly much 
more research could be conducted to further the application of Crelinsten' s framework to 
the abuses at Abu Ghraib. A large amount of data remains to be analyzed regarding the 
interrogation policies of the United States, at Abu Ghraib or more generally. 
As more time goes by;· more information will be released regarding the victims, 
the soldiers, and the bureaucracy at Abu Ghraib. By April 15, 2005, there was very 
limited disclosure of the statements of the victims at Abu Ghraib. I hope that future 
investigations into Abu Ghraib will also reveal the testimony of the victims. These data 
will enhance the application of Crelinsten's model of how and why torture occurs. After 
all, without laying blame with the victims, Crelinsten ascribed them a role in an alternate 
reality permitting torture. 
Likewise, research can be conducted on the role of bystanders in the creation of 
alternate realities. In the case of Abu Ghraib, the United Nations was a key bystander. 
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The leader of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, expressed clear disagreement with 
President Bush and his administration in declaring a preemptive war against Iraq. Yet, 
once the United States initiated hostilities, Annan and the United Nations did not take any 
action to stop the hostilities. 
Also, a cross-national or cross-historical study into interrogation policies 
appropriated by governments might be fruitful . Each government has different guidelines 
for interrogations; therefore a comparison of interrogation techniques would be insightful 
in understanding how different cultures perceive the objectives of interrogations. 
Another method in understanding the evolution of interrogation techniques would be to 
conduct a cross-historical study. Examining interrogation methods used throughout 
history, and considering the context (for example compare the methods of interrogation 
used during World War I and the most recent preemptive war with Iraq) perhaps would 
be useful in understanding why particular methods are still used, no longer used, or why 
new techniques are in effect. 
Crelinsten's  framework is broad, and there are many aspects of it that I did not 
explore. I focused on the conditions that make the creation of an alternate reality 
possible. Crelinsten explores not only the creation, but the consequences and cures for an 
alternate reality that includes torture. Further temporal distance from Abu Ghraib will 
allow future researchers to examine the consequences of Abu Ghraib as well as cures to 
prevent the same type of atrocity from occurring in the future. 
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